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SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE IN THE
REGULATORY SYSTEM:
MANUFACTURING UNCERTAINTY
AND THE DEMISE OF THE FORMAL
REGULATORY SYSTEM
David Michaels, M.P.H., Ph.D. & Celeste Monforton, M.P.H.*
INTRODUCTION
Polluters and manufacturers of dangerous products have waged
sophisticated campaigns to manufacture uncertainty about the
scientific evidence used to support public health protection and
victim compensation.1 As a result, the Occupational Safety and
Health Administration (OSHA) has virtually ceased issuing
regulations that would limit potential exposure to causes of disease
or other workplace hazards, even in the face of compelling
scientific evidence. Unfortunately, following the U.S. Supreme
Court’s decision in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,
* David Michaels, PhD, MPH, is Research Professor and Associate
Chairman, Department of Environmental and Occupational Health at The
George Washington University School of Public Health and Health Services.
Celeste Monforton, MPH, is a Research Associate in the Department of
Environmental and Occupational Health at The George Washington University
School of Public Health and Health Services. This work was supported by the
Project on Scientific Knowledge and Public Policy (SKAPP). The authors
appreciate the helpful comments provided by Eula Bingham, David Vladeck,
and the members of the SKAPP planning committee. Major support for SKAPP
is provided by the Common Benefit Trust, a fund established pursuant to a court
order in the Silicone Gel Breast Implant Products Liability Litigation.
1
A tobacco industry executive once said “doubt is our product.” Brown &
Williamson, Smoking and Health Proposal, Doc. No. 332506, at
http://tobaccodocuments.org/bw/332506.html (last visited Dec. 31, 2004).
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which requires federal judges to act as gatekeepers of expert
testimony, courts have also become the targets of such campaigns.2
Given the demise of OSHA’s regulatory activities, litigation
initiated by injured workers is likely to play an increasingly
important role in eliminating or reducing workplace hazards, and
therefore in preventing occupational illness and death. This article
examines the responses of the legal and regulatory systems to
workplace hazards, and explores the impact of litigation and
regulation on the prevention of work-related disease in the United
States.
I. POPCORN LUNG
In March 2004, Eric Peoples, a 32-year-old former employee
of a microwave popcorn factory, sued International Flavors, the
manufacturer of the butter flavoring used in his employer’s plant,
and was awarded $20 million by a jury in Joplin, Missouri.3 Mr.
Peoples, a nonsmoker, had developed bronchiolitis obliterans, a
rare and devastating lung disease characterized by an obliteration
of the pulmonary airways.4 Mr. Peoples is presently awaiting a
lung transplant.5 Statistics suggest that, if a successful transplant is
accomplished, Mr. Peoples can expect to live an additional ten
years.6
Mr. Peoples is not alone in his diagnosis with this rare disease.
Thirty cases of bronchiolitis obliterans have been documented

2

509 U.S. 579 (1993).
E & C Peoples v. Int’l Flavors, No. 01CV683025-07 (Mo. Cir. Ct. Mar.
15, 2004).
4
Bronchiolitis Obliterans is a “disease in which the bronchioles and
occasionally some of the smaller bronchi are partly or completely obliterated by
nodular masses which contain granulation and fibrotic tissue.” TABER’S
CYCLOPEDIC MEDICAL DICTIONARY 272 (17th ed. 1993).
5
Sara Shipley, Study Showed Chemical was Toxic, ST. LOUIS POST
DISPATCH, Feb. 28, 2004, at C1. See also CBSNEWS.com, Jury Gives Popcorn
Worker $20M (Mar. 16, 2004), at http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/
2004/03/16/heatlh/main606532.shtml.
6
Connie Farrow, Victim of Lung Disease is Awarded $20 Million, ST.
LOUIS POST DISPATCH, Mar. 16, 2004, at A1.
3
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among workers employed at microwave popcorn factories.7 The
lungs of eight workers from one plant were damaged severely
enough to make them candidates for lung transplantation.8 Many of
these workers are young nonsmokers.9
In early 2000, an occupational medicine physician in Kansas
City, Missouri, contacted the Missouri Department of Health
(MDOH) to report cases of bronchiolitis obliterans among workers
at the popcorn plant in Joplin where Mr. Peoples was employed.10
In turn, officials from MDOH reported the outbreak to both the
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) and the
National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) to
compel an investigation into the cause of the rare disease
outbreak.11 NIOSH scientists subsequently visited the factory and
conducted medical evaluations of the workers.12 In September
2001, NIOSH reported its preliminary results and distributed an
information sheet to the factory’s workers.13 The sheet contained
the following statement: “There is a work-related cause of lung
disease in this plant. We at NIOSH believe the problem is
continuing even after the company made changes that we

7

NIOSH Report Examines Investigation of Popcorn Plant Workers and
Lung Disease, Daily Labor Report (BNA) (Apr. 26, 2002), at
http://www.bna.com/products/labor/ dlr.htm; see also Shipley, supra note 5.
8
Shipley, supra note 5, at C1.
9
See Sara Shipley, Snack Food: Is It Hurting Workers Who Make It?, ST.
LOUIS POST DISPATCH, Apr. 4, 2004, at A1; NAT’L INST. FOR OCCUPATIONAL
SAFETY AND HEALTH, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, REPORT
NO. DHHS 2004-110, NIOSH ALERT: PREVENTING LUNG DISEASE IN WORKERS
WHO USE OR MAKE FLAVORINGS 3-4 (2003) [hereinafter NIOSH ALERT:
PREVENTING LUNG DISEASE IN WORKERS WHO USE OR MAKE FLAVORINGS].
10
NAT’L INST. FOR OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH, U.S. DEP’T OF
HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, INTERIM REPORT NO. HETA #2000-0401,
NIOSH INVESTIGATION OF GILSTER MARY LEE 4 (2001) [hereinafter NIOSH
INVESTIGATION OF GILSTER MARY LEE].
11
See Shipley, supra note 9, at A1.
12
NIOSH INVESTIGATION OF GILSTER MARY LEE, supra note 10.
13
NAT’L INST. FOR OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH, U.S. DEP’T OF
HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, IMPORTANT WORKER HEALTH NOTICE ABOUT
THE POPCORN PLANT IN JASPER, MISSOURI (2001).
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recommended.”14
In 2001, NIOSH also conducted a study in which rats were
exposed to airborne concentrations of butter flavoring for a single
six-hour period.15 The NIOSH researchers reported lung damage
among the rats exposed to vapors containing 285 to 371 parts per
million (ppm) of diacetyl, the chemical that is the primary
component of the butter flavoring.16 The study’s lead investigator,
Dr. Ann Hubbs, reported that these findings were “the most
dramatic case of cell death ever seen”17 in this type of experiment.
In their 2002 report, the NIOSH researchers explained that the
diacetyl levels to which they had exposed the rats were “not
extraordinary when compared with levels measured in the
workplace.”18
When NIOSH undertook its animal study, the agency did not
know that BASF, the German chemical manufacturer, had
conducted a similar study using pure diacetyl in 1993.19 That
study, which was never reported to the U.S. government or
published in scientific literature, found results very similar to those
of NIOSH; one four-hour period of exposure to diacetyl resulted in
an “abundance of symptoms indicative of respiratory tract
14

Id.
A.F. Hubbs et al., Necrosis of Nasal and Airway Epithelium in Rats
Inhaling Vapors of Artificial Butter Flavoring, 185 TOXICOLOGY & APPLIED
PHARMACOLOGY 128, 129 (2002).
16
NAT’L INST. FOR OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH, U.S. DEP’T OF
HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, REPORT NO. HETA #2002-0408-2915, NIOSH
HEALTH HAZARD EVALUATION REPORT: AGRILINK FOODS POPCORN PLANT 11
(2003).
17
Shipley, supra note 5, at C1.
18
Hubbs, supra note 15, at 128-35. The investigators reported that “[a]
concentration of about 200 ppm was measured inside a vat that contained butter
flavoring mixed with oil and salt.” Id. at 134. However, because the
investigation occurred after local exhaust ventilation had been installed for the
tanks, “previous concentrations were probably higher.” Id. Both the testimony
about NIOSH’s investigation at the factory and the results of the animal
experiments conducted by the agency’s scientists were presented to the jury in
Mr. Peoples’ case.
19
Personal conversation with Kay Kriess, MD, National Institute for
Occupational Safety and Health (Nov. 2, 2004).
15
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injury.”20
According to American government scientists, there is little
question that the Joplin workers developed bronchiolitis obliterans
as a result of their work in the popcorn factory.21 The manufacturer
of the butter flavoring, however, has refused to acknowledge a
connection between the exposure of workers to the butter flavoring
and the development of the lung condition. At a second trial
involving one of the lung-damaged workers, the defendant’s
toxicologist testified that there was insufficient evidence to
conclude that the lung disease in the popcorn workers was caused
by butter flavoring.22
II. OSHA: RESPONSE OR RETREAT?
Outbreaks of work-related disease and death helped fuel the
passage of the Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSH Act) in
1970.23 In congressional hearings, workers and scientists described
numerous outbreaks of work-related disease with regard to which
no action was taken until a sufficiently large number of workers
had died.24 Tony Mazzocchi, a labor leader and forceful advocate
for the OSH Act, called this “the body in the morgue approach.”25
In order to prevent future work-related epidemics, Congress
created OSHA and authorized the agency to develop standards
20

BASF, INC., REPORT: STUDY ON THE ACUTE INHALATION TOXICITY
LC50 OF DIACETYL FCC AS A VAPOR IN RATS 4-HOUR EXPOSURE, PROJECT NO.
1310247/927010 (1993) [hereinafter BASF REPORT].
21
Kay Kreiss et al., Clinical Bronchiolitis Obliterans in Workers at a
Microwave-Popcorn Plant, 347 NEW ENG. J. MED. 330, 330-38 (2002).
22
Testimony Ends in Second Trial on Claim that Popcorn Flavoring
Caused Injury, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Apr. 30, 2004.
23
Occupational Safety & Health Act (OSHA), 29 U.S.C. 651 et seq.
(1970).
24
JOSEPH A. PAGE & MARY-WIN O’BRIEN, BITTER WAGES: RALPH
NADER’S STUDY GROUP REPORT ON DISEASE AND INJURY ON THE JOB 165-66
(1973).
25
Rafael Moure-Eraso, Primary Prevention and Precaution in Hazard
Identification in the NIEHS/NTP: Body in the Morgue Approach, 117 PUB.
HEALTH REP. 564, 564-73 (Nov.-Dec. 2002), available at http://www.
publichealthreports.org/userfiles/117_6/117564.pdf.
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based on the best scientific evidence available.26 Congress afforded
the agency a great deal of leeway in identifying hazards and setting
protective exposure limits to enable the agency to act before large
numbers of individuals became sick.27
OSHA was first made aware of the risk of lung disease among
popcorn workers in May 2000.28 OSHA’s Kansas City Area Office
received a letter from the Missouri Department of Health (MDOH)
that alerted the agency to a serious and potentially deadly health
hazard confronting workers at the factory that employed Mr.
Peoples.29 The letter indicated that ten workers from one
microwave popcorn-packaging facility had been diagnosed with
bronchiolitis obliterans and that three of these workers were
awaiting lung transplants.30 Another twenty to thirty workers had
less severe, but still notable respiratory symptoms. The MDOH
reported that it planned to conduct an epidemiologic investigation
of the disease cluster, but notified OSHA that obtaining medical
releases and physician reports would take some time.31
Consequently, the MDOH asked OSHA to inspect the facility,
noting that “[a]s a regulatory agency . . . [OSHA] can more
promptly address this situation, and if there is an obvious hazard to
workers, address it quickly.”32
A few days later, an OSHA inspector visited the microwave
popcorn-packaging plant. According to the inspector’s notes, the
company had become “concerned that there might be some
environmental problem at their facility so they had their insurance
carrier Wausau come into their plant and conduct environmental
sampling for total nuisance dust.”33 The records provided to OSHA
26

Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 § 6(b)(5), 29 U.S.C. § 655
(2004) [hereinafter OSHA Act].
27
Id.; See PAGE & O’BRIEN, supra note 24.
28
Letter from Daryl W. Roberts, Director, Section for Environmental and
Public Health, Missouri Department of Health, to Matt Gaines, Occupational
Safety and Health Administration (May 19, 2000) (on file with authors).
29
Id.
30
Id.
31
Id.
32
Id.
33
Nat’l Inst. for Occupational Safety and Heath, Inspection Report, Report
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by the company indicated that the insurance carrier had taken the
air samples four years earlier in 1996.34 The OSHA inspector
performed no additional dust sampling and offered his
“professional opinion that it would be ludicrous to re-sample the
area again.”35
The inspector did, however, collect samples of respirable oil
mist and send them to OSHA’s laboratory, only to have them
discarded because the agency’s sampling method applied only to
petroleum-based oils, not vegetable oil.36 Having failed to collect
usable exposure samples, the inspector, according to his own notes,
“determined the company to be in compliance and closed out the
case file since there were no other OSHA sampling protocols at his
disposal to test further at the plant.”37 Sixteen months later, in
September 2001, an attorney representing several of the ill workers
filed a complaint with OSHA and followed up with another
complaint in December 2001.38 In her letter to the agency, the
attorney alleged that not enough had been done to improve
ventilation in the plant, as evidenced by the fact that “one
employee lost half of his lung capacity working in the plant after
ID 0728500, Inspection Number 303206387, Health Narrative: CSHO
Workplace Findings (May 23, 2000) (on file with authors) [hereinafter CSHO
Inspection Report]. The report was obtained through a Freedom of Information
Act (FOIA) request. Portions of the inspector’s notes were redacted.
34
Letter from Mike Freshwater, CIH, Senior Environmental Health
Engineer, WAUSAU, to Jim Cook, Jasper Foods, Inc. (May 10, 1996) (on file
with authors).
35
See CSHO Inspection Report, supra note 33.
36
Id. The document states:
The CSHO [compliance safety and health officer] got a telephone call
from the lab indicating that they would be unable to analyze his oil mist
samples. They said that the OSHA sampling method for oil mist
pertained only to oil mist particulate off gassed from petroleum based
oils and not vegetable food grade oils. They said they were unable to
use the CSHO’s oil mist samples at all.
Id.
37
Id.
38
Letter from Amy R. Powell, Humphrey, Farrington, McClain & Edgar,
P.C., to Rick Roberts, OSHA Kansas City Area Office (Dec. 19, 2001) (on file
with authors).
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the remedial measures” were taken.39
Following the agency’s receipt of the attorney’s letters, a
second OSHA inspector visited the plant on December 20, 2001
for only forty minutes.40 According to the inspector’s notes, he did
not conduct an inspection.41 OSHA subsequently sent a letter to the
attorney who had filed the complaints denying the need for further
investigation at the plant. 42 OSHA explained:
[T]he hazard which you brought to our attention has been
corrected and . . . Glister [sic] Mary Lee is complying with
the recommendations of NIOSH . . . . The hazard does not
fall within OSHA’s jurisdiction because there is [sic] no
Permissible Exposure Limits for the food blend chemicals
of concern that are used at the factory.43
A. OSHA 101
In situations in which there is an obvious workplace hazard but
no applicable OSHA standard, OSHA inspectors often cite to what
is commonly referred to as “the general duty clause,” which
outlines the obligation of employers to provide employees a place
of employment that is free from recognized hazards that cause or
39

Id. Ms. Powell complained: “Although NIOSH has been investigating
the plant and certain measures have been taken to improve the ventilation . . .
these measures were not enough . . . .” Id.
40
Nat’l Inst. for Occupational Safety and Health, Inspection Report
(OSHA-1), Report ID # 0728500, Inspection # 3043064083 (noting the
inspector’s entry time at the facility as 16:00 hours, opening conference with the
employer at 16:10 hours and closing conference at 16:50 hours) (on file with
authors).
41
Nat’l Inst. for Occupational Safety and Health, Complaint/Inspection
Case File Activity Diary, Kansas City Area Office, Complaint # 203783865,
Inspection # 304306483 (including a handwritten note indicating “NIOSH was
on site and conducting 18 month investigation for health hazard and ee
[employee] exposures . . . closed complaint. No inspection & send “A” letter to
comp [company]”) (on file with authors).
42
See Letter from Manuel Olmedo, OSHA Area Director, to Amy R.
Powell, Humphrey, Farrington, McClain & Edgar, P.C. (Feb. 28, 2002) (on file
with authors).
43
Id.

MICHAELS MACROED FINAL 2-18-05.DOC

OSHA AND POPCORN LUNG

3/7/2005 2:51 PM

25

are likely to cause death or serious physical harm.44 Although the
OSH Act provides OSHA with the authority to cite companies for
failing to comply with the general duty clause and courts have
confirmed this authority in the context of judicial decisions,45 in
recent years agency officials have been reluctant to invoke the
clause. In the case of the popcorn workers, OSHA’s position is that
hazards for which there is no applicable OSHA standard do “not
fall within OSHA’s jurisdiction.”46 With dozens of workers
suffering from serious lung disease, the popcorn factory hazard
would appear to be a logical candidate for an OSHA regulation.47
To initiate the regulatory process, OSHA is required to make a
determination that the proposed regulation would reduce or
eliminate a “significant risk” for workers exposed to the hazard.48
In the decision that established this requirement, the U.S.
Supreme Court noted that the risk must be “quantified sufficiently
to enable the Secretary [of Labor] to characterize it as significant
in an understandable way.”49 In an effort to meet this mandate,
OSHA has invested significant time and resources in preparing
detailed quantitative risk assessments for its health standards.50
Many of OSHA’s health standards regulate the exposure of
workers to carcinogens.51 Estimating the cancer risk associated
44

OSHA Act § 5(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 654 (2004).
See, e.g., Int’l Union v. Gen. Dynamics Land Sys. Div., 815 F.2d 1570
(D.C. Cir. 1987).
46
Letter from Manuel Olmedo to Amy R. Powell, supra note 42.
47
See NIOSH ALERT: PREVENTING LUNG DISEASE IN WORKERS WHO USE
OR MAKE FLAVORINGS, supra note 9.
48
Indus. Union Dep’t, AFL-CIO v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 639
(1980).
49
Id. at 646.
50
Testimony of Margaret Seminario before the House Committee on
Employment and Education, Subcommittee on Workforce Protection on
OSHA’s Standard Setting Process (June 14, 2001) (on file with authors); NAT’L
ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH, U.S. DEP’T OF
LABOR, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS RELATED TO OSHA’S STANDARDS
DEVELOPMENT PROCESS (June 6, 2000) [hereinafter REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATIONS RELATED TO OSHA’S STANDARDS DEVELOPMENT
PROCESS].
51
OSHA has comprehensive health standards for the following 25
45
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with exposure to various substances is difficult and often involves
extrapolating from high to low doses, and from animals to humans.
Recognizing this reality, the Supreme Court explained that it was
not the Court’s intention to place OSHA in a “mathematical
straitjacket.”52 Consequently, it permitted the agency significant
flexibility in quantifying health risks.53
Arguably, a risk assessment addressing workers’ exposure to
butter flavoring is less complex than one for a carcinogen because
it relates to a disease with rapid onset and a clear range of
disabling respiratory effects. An OSHA regulation to protect
workers from adverse health effects related to exposure to butter
flavoring could take one of at least two different approaches. One
approach would be for OSHA to regulate popcorn manufacturing
plants and prevent workers’ exposure to all butter flavoring vapors
until more is known about the cause or causes of the lung disease
in popcorn workers. A regulation of this form would protect
popcorn workers from exposure to all potentially hazardous
chemicals, including diacetyl. In 1976, OSHA embraced this
approach in developing a standard to protect workers from coke
oven emissions by requiring reductions in exposure to coal tar
pitch volatiles rather than attempting to identify the precise cancercausing agent in the coke oven emissions.54 Notably, if diacetyl is
substances that are designated by IARC as “known human” or “reasonably
anticipated to be” carcinogens: asbestos; 3,3 dichlorobenzidine; chloromethyl
methyl ether; ethyleneimine; bis(chloromethyliether); aminodiphenyl; alphanaphthylamine; N-nitrosodimethyl amine; beta-naphthylamine; 4-nitrobiphenyl;
benzidine;
4-dimethylaminoazobenzene;
2-acetylaminoflourene;
betapropiolactone; coke-oven emissions; vinyl chloride; arsenic; benzene;
acrylonitrile; formaldehyde; 4,4-methylenedianiline; cadmium; 1,3 butadiene;
and methylene chloride. Other health standards issued by OSHA (i.e., cotton
dust, lead, DBCP, and bloodborne pathogens) were designed primarily to protect
workers from non-cancer health effects.
52
Indus. Union Dep’t, AFL-CIO, 448 U.S. at 655.
53
See id.
54
Final Rule on Exposure to Coke Oven Emissions, 41 Fed. Reg. 46,742
(Oct. 22, 1976). At the time, there was considerable evidence that workers
exposed to coke oven emissions and employed in certain tasks (i.e., “topside
occupations”) had an increased risk of lung cancer. What was unknown,
however, was which specific component of the emission caused the cancer.
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the actual cause of the lung disease detected in popcorn workers,
this approach would leave diacetyl-exposed workers in other
industries unprotected.
Alternately, OSHA could issue a standard to regulate workers’
exposure to diacetyl. There is powerful evidence to suggest that
diacetyl has played a causal role in the development of
bronchiolitis obliterans in workers at facilities other than
microwave popcorn factories.55 However, there have been no
studies of workers exposed only to diacetyl, given that the
chemical is only one (albeit often the primary) component of the
flavoring mixtures to which the sick workers were exposed.
Importantly, it is not uncommon for human evidence concerning
the effects of environmental exposures to be limited or to contain
uncertainties. In many industrial workplaces, there can be
hundreds, if not thousands, of chemicals in the work environment.
It is often impossible to identify the effects of any individual
hazardous exposure. For obvious ethical reasons, additional
information cannot be gathered using experiments that involve
volunteer human subjects. Consequently, regulators generally look
to animal evidence for additional information on the toxic effects
of exposure. The BASF study demonstrated that laboratory
animals exposed to pure diacetyl developed lung disease after short
exposure.56 In NIOSH’s laboratory investigation, rats exposed to
butter flavoring whose predominant component was diacetyl
experienced a similar fate.57 While diacetyl manufacturers are
likely to claim (as they did in Mr. Peoples’s suit) that there is
legitimate scientific debate about the health effects of exposure to
OSHA suspected the excess cancer risk was related to workers’ exposure to
benzo(a)pyrene or other polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons. In the absence of
unequivocal evidence on the exact cancer-causing component, OSHA proposed
a regulation to reduce coal tar pitch volatiles as the surrogate measure for coke
oven emissions. Id.
55
See NIOSH ALERT: PREVENTING LUNG DISEASE IN WORKERS WHO USE
OR MAKE FLAVORINGS, supra note 9. There have been outbreaks of severe lung
disease at several facilities in which diacetyl is an important component of the
mixture of chemicals to which workers in the factory are exposed, including at
least two factories which do not produce butter-flavored popcorn. Id.
56
See BASF REPORT, supra note 20.
57
See Hubbs, supra note 15.
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this chemical, there is already a significant body of evidence
suggesting that diacetyl exposure causes disease.58 Further, there is
no evidence that diacetyl is not the cause of bronchiolitis
obliterans. Thus, a public health approach would support severely
restricting airborne exposure to diacetyl unless and until it is
shown to be safe.
Unfortunately, the likelihood of OSHA taking either of these
regulatory paths is small. It appears to make little difference
whether the White House is in Democratic or Republican hands.
The fact remains that new workplace health standards are rare. In
the last ten years, OSHA has issued standards for a total of two
new chemicals.59 Indeed, since its inception, OSHA has issued
comprehensive standards for only thirty toxic materials.60
Additionally, the agency enforces permissible exposure limits for
only about 500 chemicals of the more than 12,000 chemicals
characterized by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
as high volume chemicals.61 Of these 500 standards, all but a
handful were borrowed in whole from the voluntary industry levels
established prior to OSHA’s creation in 1971.
With respect to chemicals such as those to which Mr. Peoples
was exposed, the Flavor and Extract Manufacturers Association of
58

NIOSH INVESTIGATION OF GILSTER MARY LEE, supra note 10, at 4;
Fixed Obstructive Lung Disease in Workers at a Microwave Popcorn FactoryMissouri 2000-2002, 51 Mortality and Morbidity Weekly Report 345, 345-47
(Apr. 26, 2002); Kreiss et al., supra note 21.
59
See Occupational Exposure to 1,3-Butadiene, 61 Fed. Reg. 56,746,
56,856 (Nov. 4, 1996) (to be codified at 29 CFR pts. 1910, 1915 and 1926); see
also Occupational Exposure to Methylene Chloride, 62 Fed. Reg. 1494, 1619
(Jan. 10, 1997) (to be codified at 29 CFR pts. 1910, 1915 and 1926).
60
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS RELATED TO OSHA’S STANDARDS
DEVELOPMENT PROCESS, supra note 50. This report included a list of OSHA
Health Standards issued and the date each standard was originally published:
asbestos (1972/1986); 13 carcinogens (1974); vinyl chloride (1974); coke oven
emissions (1974); benzene (1978/1987); DBCP (1978); arsenic (1978); cotton
dust (1978); acrylonitrile (1978); lead (1978); ethylene oxide (1984);
formaldehyde (1987); chemical exposure in laboratories (1990); bloodborne
pathogens (1991); 4,4’ methylenedianiline (1992); cadmium (1992); 1,3
butadiene (1996); methylene chloride (1997). Id.
61
“High volume” means that more than 1 million pounds of the chemical is
produced annually.
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the United States estimates that 1,037 flavoring ingredients pose
potential respiratory hazards to workers.62 However, workplace
exposure limits have been established for fewer than 5% of them.63
B. OSHA’s Response to the Popcorn Lung Outbreak
When faced with a hazard for which no standard has been set,
OSHA has the authority to issue an emergency temporary standard
or to invoke the “general duty clause.”64 OSHA selected neither of
these options in approaching the prevention of lung disease among
the popcorn workers. Despite significant “bodies in the morgue”
evidence, OSHA maintains that “a cause-effect relationship
between diacetyl and bronchiolitis obliterans has not been
established, as food-processing workers with this lung disease
were also exposed to other flavoring agents.”65
In lieu of industry regulation, OSHA elected to sign a
“partnership agreement” in September 2002 with The Popcorn
Board to “help foster a culture of prevention.”66 This move is part
of a greater effort by OSHA to form alliances with corporations,
trade associations, and other organizations to voluntarily develop
and share information regarding worker health and safety. OSHA’s
Assistant Secretary reported in February 2004 that the agency had
forty-six national alliances and 105 regional alliances.67 There are
62

See NIOSH ALERT: PREVENTING LUNG DISEASE IN WORKERS WHO USE
supra note 9.
63
Id.
64
OSHA Act §§ 5(a)(1) & 6(c)(1), 29 U.S.C. §§ 654, 655 (2004).
65
Occupational Safety and Health Administration, Safety/Health Topics,
Chemical Sampling Information, Diacetyl, at http://www.osha.gov/dts/
chemicalsampling/data/CH_231710.html (last visited Jan. 24, 2005).
66
Occupational Safety and Health Administration, Cooperative Programs,
Alliance, Regional Alliances and State Plans, Region VII, Agreement
Establishing an Alliance between the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration U.S. Department of Labor Region VII and The Popcorn Board
(Sept. 22, 2002) [hereinafter Alliance Agreement], at http://www.osha.gov/
dcsp/alliances/regional/reg7/popcorn.html.
67
Testimony of John Henshaw, Assistant Secretary of Labor for
Occupational Safety and Health, before the United States House of
Representatives Committee on Appropriations (Feb. 26, 2004), available at
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no specific requirements for forming an alliance with OSHA and,
by design, the agreements lack an enforcement component.68
According to OSHA’s 2002 alliance agreement with The Popcorn
Board, the two entities would work cooperatively to develop an
internal document to be sent to OSHA field compliance officers.69
Nearly two years later, the hazard bulletin that supposedly would
help OSHA inspectors understand the butter flavor hazard and
conduct effective inspections has not been issued.70
Unfortunately, no other federal agency shares in OSHA’s
authority to address workplace hazards. Under the Toxic
Substances Control Act (TSCA), chemical manufacturers are
required to test their products to determine whether they pose a
“significant risk of serious or widespread harm to human beings.”71
If such a risk exists, the EPA can take action to prevent or reduce
the risk. Diacetyl, the suspect hazard in butter flavoring, is a food
additive and therefore is explicitly exempt from TSCA.
Furthermore, relying on the TSCA to protect the public from
http://appropriations.house.gov/_files/JohnHenshawtestimony.pdf.
68
Occupational Safety and Health Administration, Alliance: An OSHA
Cooperative Program, at http://www.osha.gov/dcsp/alliances/index.html (last
visited Jan. 24, 2005).
69
See Alliance Agreement, supra note 66, which reads: “Representatives of
The Popcorn Board will review and provide comment and input on a draft
OSHA ‘Hazard Information Bulletin’ to be developed by OSHA for internal
distribution to it’s [sic] compliance officers in the field.”
70
Letter from Charles Adkins, OSHA Regional Administrator, to David
Michaels, George Washington University (June 4, 2004) (on file with authors).
The letter responded to a FOIA request and reported: “The Hazard Information
Bulletin referenced in the Alliance is still under review at the OSHA National
Office.” Id.
71
15 U.S.C. § 2603(f) (2005).
(f) Required actions:
Upon the receipt of any test data . . . or any other information available
to the Administrator which indicates . . . that . . . a chemical substance
or mixture presents or will present a significant risk of serious or
widespread harm to human beings from cancer, gene mutations, or
birth defects, the Administrator shall, within the 180-day period . . .
initiate appropriate action . . . .
Id.
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chemical hazards is unlikely to be successful. Indeed, Congress’s
General Accounting Office (now known as the Government
Accountability Office) reported that only four chemicals were
restricted under TSCA in the period between 1976, when the Act
became law, and 1994, when the study was carried out.72
The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) is similarly limited
in its ability to address potential workplace hazards. Although the
FDA is charged with ensuring “the safety of the nation’s
domestically-produced and imported foods,”73 because the FDA
has concluded that diacetyl is “generally recognized as safe . . . as
a direct food ingredient,” the FDA has satisfied its statutory
mandate.74 That is, diacetyl is safe for humans to consume;
however, the FDA makes no attempt to determine whether diacetyl
is safe for workers to inhale.
Given the inability or unwillingness of the nation’s regulatory
apparatus to address workplace hazards, litigation by Mr. Peoples
and similarly situated popcorn workers is a logical alternative. In
fact, it may be the only means of compelling employers to protect
their workers.
III. REAL AND MANUFACTURED SCIENTIFIC UNCERTAINTY IN THE
REGULATORY PROCESS: AN INVITATION TO INACTION
There are few scientific challenges more complex than
understanding the cause of disease in humans. Scientists cannot
feed people toxic chemicals, for example, to see what doses cause
cancer. Instead, investigators must harness the outcomes of
“natural experiments” in which exposures have already occurred.
In laboratories, by contrast, scientists design and control
experiments on animals to determine the impact of toxic agents on
72

U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT NUMBER GAO/T-RCED-94212, TOXIC SUBSTANCES CONTROL ACT: EPA’S LIMITED PROGRESS IN
REGULATING TOXIC CHEMICALS (1994).
73
U.S. Food and Drug Admin., Overview of the Center for Food Safety
and Applied Nutrition, at http://www.cfsan.fda.gov/~lrd/cfsan4.html (last visited
Jan. 24, 2005).
74
Listing of Specific Substances Affirmed as GRAS (Generally
Recognized as Safe), 21 C.F.R. § 184.1278 (2005).
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these subjects. Both epidemiologic and laboratory studies involve
uncertainty and require scientists to extrapolate from study-specific
evidence to make causal inferences and recommend protective
measures.
Much of the public discussion (or controversy) surrounding
public health and the environmental regulation of chemicals
focuses on the acceptability of existing exposures. Policymakers
recognize that uncertainty is inevitable in human risk assessment.
However, as Christine Todd Whitman, former administrator of the
EPA, points out, “the absence of certainty is not an excuse to do
nothing.”75 Generally, if a federal regulatory agency finds that
exposures are contributing to or are likely to contribute to disease,
polluters or others responsible for the exposure will be required to
devote resources to ameliorating the problem. When the prospect
of regulation is associated with substantial costs, a debate about the
underlying science ensues, typically focusing on the question of
scientific certainty.
Absolute certainty in the regulatory sciences is rare. Yet there
is a growing trend in regulatory agencies that demands proof over
precaution in the realm of public health and the environment. By
way of example, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)
recently announced that it would permit the re-opening of the
Davis-Besse nuclear reactor near Toledo, Ohio.76 Two years
earlier, the facility had come within a quarter-inch of a major
radiation release, possibly the worst accident of this kind in U.S.
history. A mixture of water and boric acid had eaten through six
inches of carbon steel, leaving only a thin layer of stainless steel to
contain the water in the Davis-Besse nuclear reactor’s vessel
head.77 When the facility was finally inspected, the last steel layer
75

Christine Todd Whitman, Remarks on “Effective Policy Making: The
Role of Good Science” at the National Academy of Science’s Symposium on
Nutrient Over-Enrichment of Coastal Waters (Oct. 13, 2000), at
http://www.usembassy.it/file2001_01/alia/a0010407.htm.
76
Matthew L. Wald, Nuclear Plant, Closed After Corrosion, Will Reopen,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 9, 2004, at A16.
77
U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT NO. GAO-04-415, NUCLEAR
REGULATION: NRC NEEDS TO MORE AGGRESSIVELY AND COMPREHENSIVELY
RESOLVE ISSUES RELATED TO THE DAVIS-BESSE NUCLEAR POWER PLANT’S
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was bulging, barely able to contain the highly-pressurized
coolant.78
Three months prior to NRC’s inspection, NRC experts
predicted cooling system breaches at the Ohio plant following the
discovery of cracks in two similar nuclear reactors.79 The agency
asked the operators of all similar reactors to close voluntarily for
inspection.80 Davis-Besse’s operator refused and NRC staff
prepared an order demanding the closure and inspection of the
reactor. The order was never issued, however, because the NRC
supervisor demanded “absolute proof” that the vessel head was
damaged before he would authorize a facility shutdown.81
Problematically, this proof could only be obtained through a postshutdown inspection.

SHUTDOWN 1 (2004).
78
See Memorandum from Hubert T. Bell, Inspector General, U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission, to Richard A. Meserve, Former Chairman, U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, on “NRC’s Regulation of Davis-Besse
Regarding Damage to the Reactor Vessel Head (Case No. 02-03S)” 17 (Dec. 30,
2002) (“The remaining thickness of the RPV head in the wastage area was found
to be approximately 3/8 inch . . . .”), available at www.nrc.gov/ reading-rm/doccollections/insp-gen/2003/02-03s.pdf; Memorandum from Hubert T. Bell,
Inspector General, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, to Nils J. Diaz,
Chairman, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, on “NRC’s Oversight of
Davis-Besse Boric Acid Leakage and Corrosion during the April 2000 Refueling
Outage (Case No. 03-02s)” 6 (Oct. 17, 2003); 16 N.R.C. INSPECTOR GENERAL
SEMIANNUAL REP. NO. 2 (Oct. 1, 2003 – Mar. 31, 2004) (“This was the only
material preventing a breach of the reactor coolant pressure boundary . . . .”),
available at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/nuregs/staff/sr1415/
v16n2/.
79
Memorandum from Hubert T. Bell to Richard A. Meserve, supra note
78, at 6.
80
U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT NO. GAO-04-415,
NUCLEAR REGULATION: NRC NEEDS TO MORE AGGRESSIVELY AND
COMPREHENSIVELY RESOLVE ISSUES RELATED TO THE DAVIS-BESSE NUCLEAR
POWER PLANT’S SHUTDOWN 2 (2004).
81
Id. at 34.
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IV. “DOUBT IS OUR PRODUCT”82
The production and use of scientific data in public policy has
become an adversarial endeavor with unfortunate results both for
science and society. An entire industry has emerged to lend
support to the generic assertion, made with great frequency by
opponents of regulation, that science is uncertain and that
regulation cannot proceed until more conclusive data are collected.
This industry specializes in magnifying and manufacturing
uncertainty about the science supporting public health regulation.
The tobacco industry has perfected the strategy. For nearly fifty
years, tobacco companies hired scientists to disprove that smokers
were at a greater risk of dying of lung cancer, heart disease, and
other tobacco-related illnesses than were nonsmokers.83 The
industry also hired scientists to refute evidence that environmental
tobacco smoke increased disease risk in nonsmokers.84 In each
case, the scientific community eventually reached the consensus
that tobacco smoke caused the studied medical conditions.85 In
82

Brown & Williamson, supra note 1.
The tobacco industry’s strategy for casting doubt on the adverse health
effects of their product has been documented by numerous researchers including
RICHARD KLUGER, ASHES TO ASHES: AMERICA’S HUNDRED-YEAR CIGARETTE
WAR, THE PUBLIC HEALTH, AND THE UNABASHED TRIUMPH OF PHILIP MORRIS
(1996); STANTON A. GLANTZ, JOHN SLADE, ET AL., CIGARETTE PAPERS (1996);
DAVID KESSLER, A QUESTION OF INTENT: A GREAT AMERICAN BATTLE WITH A
DEADLY INDUSTRY (2001).
84
KLUGER, supra note 83; GLANTZ, supra note 83; KESSLER, supra note
83.
85
OFFICE ON SMOKING AND HEALTH, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH,
EDUCATION AND WELFARE, NO. 1103, SMOKING AND HEALTH: REPORT OF THE
ADVISORY COMMITTEE TO THE SURGEON GENERAL OF THE PUBLIC HEALTH
SERVICE
(1964),
available
at
http://www.cdc.gov/tobacco/sgr/
sgr_1964/1964%20SGR%20Intro.pdf; Office on Smoking and Health, U.S.
Department of Health, Education and Welfare, DHEW Publication No. 7950066, Smoking and Health: A Report of the Surgeon General (1979), at
http://www.cdc.gov/tobacco/sgr/; National Research Council, Environmental
Tobacco Smoke: Measuring Exposures and Assessing Health Effects (1986);
OFFICE OF HEALTH AND ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT, U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION AGENCY, REPORT NO. EPA/600/6-90/006F, RESPIRATORY HEALTH
EFFECTS OF PASSIVE SMOKING: LUNG CANCER AND OTHER DISORDERS (1992);
83
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spite of overwhelming scientific evidence and the smoking-related
deaths of millions of people, the tobacco industry waged a
campaign that successfully delayed regulation and victim
compensation for decades.
Among other tools used by the tobacco industry to manufacture
scientific uncertainty was the journal Tobacco and Health
Research, a publication aimed at physicians and scientists. The
journal’s criteria for selecting articles are telling: “the most
important type of story is that which casts doubt on the cause and
effect theory of disease and smoking.”86 The journal’s public
relations firm, Hill and Knowlton, advised that headlines “should
strongly call out the point—Controversy! Contradiction! Other
Factors! Unknowns!”87 The same message was communicated to
the public. One tobacco industry executive explained: “Doubt is
our product since it is the best means of competing with the ‘body
of fact’ that exists in the minds of the general public. It is also the
means of establishing a controversy.”88
The manufacture of doubt has become so commonplace that it
now is unusual for the science behind an environmental regulation
to remain unchallenged. The National Toxicology Program, for
example, biannually issues a list of substances that can cause
cancer.89 Before a new substance can be designated a carcinogen, it
must be subjected to a public process involving several
independent scientific reviews. During this process, industryemployed scientists have challenged the designation of various
substances as “cancer-causing” and have disputed the evidence
underlying the assignment of this designation to alcoholic
Richard Doll et al., Mortality in relation to smoking: 50 years’ observations on
male British doctors, 328 BRIT. MED. J. 1519, 1519 (2004).
86
Memorandum from Carl Thompson, Vice President, Hill & Knowlton,
Inc., to William Kloepfer, Jr., Vice President, The Tobacco Institute, Inc. (Oct.
18, 1968), available at http://tobaccodocuments.org/ti/TIMN00714881491.html#footnote_4.
87
Id.
88
Brown & Williamson, supra note 1.
89
NATIONAL TOXICOLOGY PROGRAM, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND
HUMAN SERVICES, TENTH REPORT ON CARCINOGENS (2002), available at
http://ehp.niehs.nih.gov/roc/toc10.html.
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beverages,90 beryllium,91 crystalline silica,92 ethylene oxide,93
nickel compounds,94 and certain wood dusts.95 In each of these
cases, the examined substance had already been categorized by the
International Agency for Research on Cancer as “carcinogenic to
humans.”96
Debates regarding the validity of science persist, even in the
face of powerful evidence. Within the scientific community, for
example, there is strong consensus that broad-spectrum ultraviolet
90

See William Waddell, Public comment as reported in the Report of
Carcinogens Subcommittee Meeting, National Toxicology Program Board of
Scientific Counselors (Dec. 2-3, 1998), available at http://ntp.niehs.nih.gov.
91
H. Daniel Roth, Public comment as reported in the Report of
Carcinogens Subcommittee Meeting, National Toxicology Program Board of
Scientific Counselors (Jan. 20-21, 2000), available at http://ntp.niehs.nih.gov;
Dimitrios Trichopoulos, Public comment as reported in the Report of
Carcinogens Subcommittee Meeting, National Toxicology Program Board of
Scientific Counselors (Jan. 20-21, 2000), available at http://ntp.niehs.nih.gov.
92
Robert Glenn, Public comment as reported in the Report of Carcinogens
Subcommittee Meeting, National Toxicology Program Board of Scientific
Counselors (Dec. 2-3, 1998), available at http://ntp.niehs.nih.gov; William
Moll, Public comment as reported in the Report of Carcinogens Subcommittee
Meeting, National Toxicology Program Board of Scientific Counselors (Dec. 23, 1998), available at http://ntp.niehs.nih.gov.
93
Julian Preston, Public comment as reported in the Report of Carcinogens
Subcommittee Meeting, National Toxicology Program Board of Scientific
Counselors (Dec. 2-3, 1998), available at http://ntp.niehs.nih.gov; M. Jane Teta,
Public comment as reported in the Report of Carcinogens Subcommittee
Meeting, National Toxicology Program Board of Scientific Counselors (Dec. 23, 1998), available at http://ntp.niehs.nih.gov; Sara Schotland, Public comment
as reported in the Report of Carcinogens Subcommittee Meeting, National
Toxicology Program Board of Scientific Counselors (Dec. 2-3, 1998), available
at http://ntp.niehs.nih.gov.
94
Adriana Oller, Public comment as reported in the Report of Carcinogens
Subcommittee Meeting, National Toxicology Program Board of Scientific
Counselors (Dec. 2-3, 1998), available at http://ntp.niehs.nih.gov.
95
William Blot, Public comment as reported in the Report of Carcinogens
Subcommittee Meeting, National Toxicology Program Board of Scientific
Counselors (Dec. 13-15, 2000), available at http://ntp.niehs.nih.gov.
96
International Agency for Research on Cancer, Overall Evaluations of
Carcinogenicity to Humans, available at http://monographs.iarc.fr/monoeval/
crthgr01.html (last visited Jan. 26, 2003).
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(UV) radiation from sunlight and tanning lamps causes skin
cancer. Regardless, the trade association that represents tanning
salons has continued to question the scientific evidence that
supports UV radiation’s designation as a carcinogen. 97
Similarly, opponents of OSHA regulation have disputed many
of the health standards proposed by the agency.98 For example,
when OSHA first proposed to regulate exposure to cotton dust, the
cause of a serious lung disease among textile workers, the textile
industry asserted a number of claims in order to halt or delay
regulation.99 The industry argued that the lung disease, known as
byssinosis, was not a true clinical entity and that additional
research was required to identify the exact portion of the cotton
plant that caused the respiratory problem.100 OSHA considered all
97

Stephen Ross, Public comment, as reported in the Report of Carcinogens
Subcommittee Meeting, National Toxicology Program Board of Scientific
Counselors (December 13-15, 2000), available at http://ntp.niehs.
nih.gov/ntp.htdocs/Liason/121300.pdf.
98
Section 6(f) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 allows
“any person who may be adversely affected by a standard . . . [to] file a petition
challenging the validity of such standard with the United States court of
appeals . . . .” OSHA Act § (6)(f), 29 U.S.C. 655 (2005). See Color Pigments
Mfrs. Ass’n, Inc. v. OSHA, 16 F.3d 1157 (11th Cir. 1994) (discussing OSHA’s
cadmium standard); Am. Dental Ass’n v. Secretary of Labor, 984 F.2d 823 (7th
Cir. 1993) (discussing OSHA’s bloodborne pathogens standard); Am. Petroleum
Inst. v. OSHA, 581 F.2d 493 (5th Cir. 1978) (discussing OSHA’s benzene
standard); Iron & Steel Inst. v. OSHA, 577 F.2d 825 (3d Cir. 1978) (discussing
OSHA’s coke oven emissions standard); Am. Soc’y for the Plastics Indus. v.
OSHA, 509 F.2d 1301 (2d Cir. 1975) (discussing OSHA’s vinyl chloride
standard); Synthetic Organic Chem. Mfrs. Ass’n v. Brennan, 503 F.2d 1155 (3d
Cir. 1974) (discussing OSHA’s 14 carcinogens); United Auto Workers v.
Pendergrass, 878 F.2d 389 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (discussing OSHA’s formaldehyde
standard); United Steelworkers of Am. v. Marshall, 647 F.2d 1189 (D.C. Cir.
1980) (discussing OSHA’s lead standard); AFL-CIO v. Marshall, 617 F.2d 636
(D.C. Cir. 1979) (discussing OSHA’s cotton dust standard); Indus. Union Dep’t
v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (discussing OSHA’s asbestos
standard).
99
Proposed Health Standard on Cotton Dust, 41 Fed. Reg. 56,498 (Dec. 28,
1976).
100
See Statement of M.C. Battigelli, M.D., before the Public Hearing
Concerning the Proposed Change in the OSHA Cotton Dust Standard (Apr. 1,
1977) (on file with authors); see also Statement of W.K.C. Morgan, M.D., West
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of the available scientific evidence and proceeded with its
regulation. Today, byssinosis has been virtually eliminated in the
United States—an unqualified public health success.101
Unfortunately, the strategy of creating uncertainty regarding
the risks associated with pharmaceutical use, chemical exposure,
and the use of hazardous products, has been remarkably successful.
By raising the cry of “junk science” and questioning the validity or
strength of scientific evidence, polluters and manufacturers of
dangerous products have been able to delay, often for decades,
regulations and other measures designed to protect the health and
safety of individuals and communities. This strategy, which has
been readily employed by the textile industry and tobacco
manufacturers, has been embraced by many industries facing new
regulation. Through the promotion of the “junk science”
movement, polluters and manufacturers have sought to influence
public opinion by ridiculing scientists whose research presents an
economic threat, irrespective of the quality of the scientists’
research. Further, industries facing regulation frequently challenge
the scientific studies (and even scientific methods) used in the
regulatory and legal arenas as fundamentally flawed, contradictory,
or incomplete. Thus, they assert, it would be unfair or premature to
regulate the exposure in question or to compensate the worker or
community resident who may have been made sick by the
exposure.
V. DOUBT, SCIENCE AND THE COURTS
The influence of “junk science” arguments on the judiciary is
Virginia University School of Medicine, before the Public Hearing Concerning
the Proposed Change in the OSHA Cotton Dust Standard (on file with authors);
Statement of Jack W. Whitworth, M.D., American Textile Manufacturers
Institute, Inc., before the Public Hearing Concerning the Proposed Change in the
OSHA Cotton Dust Standard (on file with authors).
101
See NAT’L INST. FOR OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH, U.S. DEP’T
OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, PUBLICATION NO. 2003-111, THE WORKRELATED LUNG DISEASE SURVEILLANCE REPORT (2002); see also Regulatory
Review of OSHA’s Cotton Dust Standard, 65 Fed. Reg. 76667-01 (2000)
(noting that the prevalence of byssinosis among cotton textile workers declined
from 20% in the 1970’s to 0.68% in 2000).
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clear. In recent years, courts have come to worship scientific
certainty. Since the Supreme Court’s decision in Daubert v.
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., federal judges have had an
obligation to serve as scientific gatekeepers, allowing into
evidence only expert testimony that meets specific standards for
relevance and reliability.102 In fact, a recent study found that courts
are now asking doctors who testify as experts to meet standards
that exceed those that the doctors use to diagnose and treat their
own patients.103
The influence of the Daubert decision is evident in the
litigation regarding the harmful effects of Parlodel, a drug
prescribed in the early 1990s to stop postpartum lactation.104 Until
it was withdrawn from the market, a number of young women who
had been prescribed Parlodel experienced severe circulatory
system episodes, such as heart attacks and strokes, shortly after
taking the drug.105 On the basis of case reports and animal studies,
in 1985, the FDA requested that the drug’s manufacturer include
warnings about hypertension, seizure, and stroke on the drug’s
label.106 Evidence continued to accumulate and the FDA’s concern
became so great that, in 1994, it requested that Parlodel’s
manufacturer stop selling the drug to lactating women.107
However, when several women sued the drug’s manufacturer,
claiming that Parlodel was responsible for their illnesses, their
cases were thrown out of court for lack of scientific certainty.108
Similarly, judges in several jurisdictions refused to allow jurors to
consider the testimony of scientists or physicians who opined that
102

Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
Jerome P. Kassirer & Joe S. Cecil, Inconsistency in Evidentiary
Standards for Medical Testimony: Disorder in the Courts, 288 JAMA 1382,
1382-87 (2002).
104
Margaret A. Berger, What Has a Decade of Daubert Wrought? AM. J.
OF PUB. HEALTH (forthcoming 2005).
105
See Kassirer & Cecil, supra note 103.
106
Opportunity for a Hearing on a Proposal to Withdraw Approval of the
Indication, 59 Fed. Reg. 43347-01, 43347-43348 (Aug 23, 1994).
107
Id. at 43347.
108
See Siharath v. Sandoz Pharm. Corp., 131 F. Supp. 2d 1347 (N.D. Ga.
2000); Rider v. Sandoz Pharm. Corp., 295 F.3d 1194 (11th Cir. 2002).
103
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Parlodel could cause circulatory disorders.109
Applying the Daubert rule, these judges demanded a level of
certainty that was virtually impossible to provide. Some experts
have suggested that the Supreme Court’s Daubert decision or,
more appropriately, some judges’ interpretation of Daubert,
encourages an anti-scientific method for evaluating scientific
evidence.110 In contrast to the weight-of-the-evidence approach
employed by scientists, this method requires that each piece of
scientific data be evaluated independently for relevance and
reliability—an approach University of Texas law professor
Thomas O. McGarity refers to as “corpuscular.”111
Opponents of workplace safety and environmental regulation
are seeking to institutionalize this anti-scientific approach in
federal agencies. The U.S. Chamber of Commerce, for example,
advocates the application of the “Daubert criteria” to regulatory
proceedings.112 However, this corpuscular approach is problematic
when applied to the determination of causation in individual tort
cases, and it is both counterproductive and dangerous when applied
to the scientific evidence that forms the basis of public health
regulations. Since its inception, OSHA has used a weight-of-theevidence approach to demonstrate the necessity of protective
action and to craft health standards that have ultimately proved
successful in reducing hazardous exposures. OSHA’s early health
standards were not based on perfect scientific information;
nonetheless, the weight of the evidence was sufficient to support

109

See Kassirer & Cecil, supra note 103, at 1387.
Carl Cranor, Scientific Inference in the Laboratory and the Law, AM. J.
OF PUB. HEALTH (forthcoming 2005); Sheldon Krimsky, The “Weight-ofScientific-Evidence” in Policy & Law, AM. J. OF PUB. HEALTH (forthcoming
2005); Ronald Melnick, A Daubert Motion: A Legal Strategy to Exclude
Essential Scientific Evidence in Toxic Tort Litigation AM. J. OF PUB. HEALTH
(forthcoming 2005).
111
Thomas O. McGarity, Science In The Regulatory Process: On the
Prospect of Daubertizing Judicial Review of Risk Assessment, 66 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 155 (2003).
112
U.S. Chamber of Commerce, Scientific Information in Federal
Rulemaking, available at http://www.uschamber.com/issues/index/regulatory/
scientific_rulemaking.htm (last visited Jan. 28, 2005).
110
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the issuance of protective regulations that have saved lives.113
Given OSHA’s reluctance to issue new occupational health
standards, litigation pursued by injured workers is likely to play an
increasingly important role in eliminating or reducing workplace
hazards, and in preventing occupational illness and death. Despite
the above evidentiary limitations, litigation remains a viable and
valuable avenue for workers seeking to hold employers
accountable for their failure to ensure workplace health and safety.
While the damage has already been done to Mr. Peoples’s
lungs and to the lungs of other popcorn workers, the $20 million
verdict in Mr. Peoples’s case is likely to compel manufacturers and
employers to ensure that workers are provided adequate protection.
Perhaps it will even encourage the food industry to develop a way
to make butter-flavored microwave popcorn without endangering
the lives of workers.

113

David Michaels & Celeste Monforton, Manufacturing Uncertainty:
Contested Science and the Protection of the Public’s Health and Environment.
AM. J. OF PUB. HEALTH (forthcoming 2005).

